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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
(1927), where a drawing for an automobile was conducted without
charge among those attending an auction. The Virginia court
held that one's attendance at the sale was legal detriment which
supplied the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery. The court in the Huntington Theatre case did not refer to
this Virginia case in rendering its decision.
On the other hand, a minority of courts hold that a valuable
consideration is necessary to constitute a lottery, and that such is
not shown by a mere technical consideration or by increased revenues arising from larger attendance or by the purchase of a ticket
of admission where that is not a condition precedent to participation. State v. Eames, 87 N. H. 477, 183 At. 590 (1936); State v.
Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N. W. 608 (1936); People v. Shafer,
160 Misc. 174, 289 N. Y. S. 649, affd, 273 N. Y. 475, 6 N. E.2d 410
(1936); People v. Cardas, 137 Cal. App. 788, 28 P.2d 99 (1933).
It must be pointed out that in the Huntington Theatre case,
the court was apparently dealing with a scheme whereby all but a
few were required to purchase a ticket of admission in order to participate in the give-away program. It does not necessarily follow
that the court will find the element of consideration present where
participation is open to all without the necessity of purchasing a
ticket, even though such a requirement as presence in the vicinity
of the theatre in order to claim the prize promptly serves to induce
rieirly all those desiring to participate to purchase tickets so as to
be seated in the theatre at the time the awards are made. However, the court cited with approval and appeared to base its decision
upon the reasoning of many of the cases herein cited under the
majority view. It would seem to be a fair inference that the court
in the future will not tolerate any similar scheme which is cloaked
with a flimsy veil of "free participation" and designed to evade the
lottery statute.
J. T. C., Jr.
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AcToN.-A fractured his arm in a
coal mine. A and his employer, B, were subject to the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Dr. X of Y hospital treated A, and the state
compensation commissioner paid for the medical and surgical care.
Compensation paid to A for his total injury was upon a fifteen perrENSATION PAYMENT AS BAR TO
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cent permanent partial disability basis. A then brought suit against
X and Y for their alleged negligence. The circuit court dismissed the
action. Held, that an employee who is paid compensation for an
injury received in the course of employment, including any aggravation thereof, cannot maintain an action against a physician chosen
by him for malpractice in negligently aggravating such injury. Affirmed. Makarenko v. Scott, 55 S. E.2d 88 (W. Va. 1949).
If the principal case were out of simple tort, no fault could be
found with the court's decision. See W. VA. REv. CODE c. 55, art. 7,
§12 (Michie, 1949) and annotations. But compensation payment
does not affect tort liability so as to release a subsequent tortfeasor.
It is a contractual obligation, similar to accident or life insurance,
substituted in lieu of the employer's common law liability, and is
imposed regardless of fault. Note 38 HAtv. L. REv. 971 (1925).
"That a person may be protected by accident insurance and at the
same time have a right of action against a person whose negligence
produced the accident resulting in his injury is well settled." Merrillv. Torpedo Co., 79 W. Va. 669, 679, 92 S. E. 112, 116 (1917). An
employer making payment under the West Virginia Compensation
Act, W. VA. REv. CODE c. 23 (Michie, 1949), fulfills only his own contractual obligation, and does not satisfy liability of the third party
tortfeasor to the employee. Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 115 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1940). Thus, if the
above view as to the effect of compensation payment is adopted,
the argument as to recovery of compensation and recovery from the
third party being a double recovery for a single wrong should give
way to the principle that one should be held accountable for the
consequences of his own wrong.
Viewing compensation payment in this light, the courts generally hold that, in the absence of an express statutory provision subrogating the employer or insurer to the employee's rights against a
third party, the employee can recover both from the compensation
fund and against the third party tortfeasor. Crab OrchardImprovYement Co. v. Chesapeake 8c Ohio Ry., supra (holding that the em.
ployer is not subrogated to employee's right of action against the
third party, in West Virginia); Hotel Equipment Co. v. Liddell, 32
Ga. App. 590, 124 S. E. 92 (1924); Newark Paving Co. v. Klotz, 85
N. J. L. 432, 91 Atl. 91 (1914); Notes, 38 H.Auv. L. REv. 971 (1925),
46 YALE L. J. 695 (1937), 26 VA. L. REv. 524 (1939). This result has
been followed in West Virginia in cases where the third party was
the original wrongdoer. Mercer v. Ott, 78 W. Va. 629, 89 S. E. 952

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol52/iss2/7

2

C.: Workmen's Compensation--Third Party Tortfeasor--Compensation Paym
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
(1916); Merrill v. Torpedo Co., supra. And before the overruling
effect of W. VA. REv. CODE C.28, art. 2, §6a (Michie, 1949), the fact
that the third party was a co-employee did not change this. Tawney
v. Kirkhart, 44 S. E.2d 634 (W. Va. 1947). To the effect that a physician has the status of any other third party in reference to the
workmen's compensation acts see Leidy, Malpractice Actions and
CompensationActs, 29 MICH. L. REv. 568 (1931).
While it is true that a majority of states prevent the employee
from recovering both from the compensation fund and the negligent physician, the applicability of these decisions in West Virginia
may be seriously questioned; the statutes in all but three states,
West Virginia, Ohio and New Hampshire, contain some subrogation provisions. 8 SCHNEMER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 176 (3d
ed. 1943). For example, the following cases concur with the instant
case in result, i.e., in holding that receipt of compensation prevents
the employee from maintaining an action against the physician, but
the statutes involved all have subrogation provisions transferring
his right to the employer or insurer so that the physician does not
escape the consequences of his negligence: Vatalaro v. Thomas, 262
Mass. 363, 160 N. E. 269 (1928); Jordon v. Orcutt, 279 Mass. 413,
181 N. E. 661 (1932) (employer's suit); Poluchav. Landes, 60 N. D.
159, 23 N. W. 264 (1930); McDonough v. National Hospital Ass'n,
134 Ore. 451, 294 Pac. 351 (1930); Revell v. Caughan, 162 Tenn.
532, 89 S. W.2d 269 (1931); Retelle v. Sullivan, 191 Wis. 576, 211
N. W. 756 (1927); Huntoon v. Prichard,280 III. App. 440, 14 N. E.
2d 507 (1938), aff'd, 371 Ill. 36, 20 N. E.2d 53 (1939) (employee's
suit for joint benefit of himself and employer).
The West Virginia court distinguished the instant case from
prior West Virginia cases involving third parties on a factual basis,
i.e., original wrongdoers as distinguished from a subsequent tortfeasor. Thus, one seemingly finds the court saying that compensation
is in the nature of a contractual payment which does not release an
original tortfeasor. Yet, where the physician is a subsequent tortfeasor the court says compensation payment is, in effect, payment
releasing the physician from tort liability. If compensation payment does not release the tortfeasor in the one instance, it should
not release a tortfeasor in the other. The sounder view would seem
to be that payment from the fund, in the absence of any subrogation
provision, should not affect the employee's rights against any third
party tortfeasor. To hold otherwise, as in the instant case, would
allow the physician to escape completely the consequences of his
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negligence. If the instant case is to be the law, preventing the employee from bringing suit, the employer should be allowed, by statute, to recover from the physician. For as it now stands the employer pays for the physician's negligence, but the tortfeasor escapes
all liability. Such a result would seem to be unjust.
The instant case raises the further question, as yet undecided
in West Virginia: is the remedy of workmen's compensation in
cases of aggravation caused by a physician exclusive, or may the
employee split his cause of action, that is, accept compensation for
the original injury only, and sue the physician for his malpractice?
It will suffice for present purposes to say that there is a division of
authority upon the point. Cases holding that an employee may
split his remedy are: King v. Baur Confectionery Co., 100 Colo. 528,
68 P.2d 909 (1937); Smith v. Mann, 184 Minn. 485, 239 N. W. 223
(1931). 'Contra: McDonald v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp.,
288 Mass. 170, 192 N. E. 608 (1934); William v. Dale, 139 Ore. 105,
8 P.2d 578 (1932).
-T. N. C.
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